Date of Award
2019
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelors
Department
Social Sciences
First Advisor
Coe, Richard
Area of Concentration
Economics
Abstract
This thesis addresses various institutional methods by Major League Baseball franchise owners to suppress wages below competitive levels. The most significant change was the institution of a ‘hard-cap’ system that places a finite amount that the industry can spend on international amateurs as compared to the less restrictive policy of the previous labor agreement. The new policy greatly restricts the available industry endowment to spend internationally which has led to reduced signing bonuses in the 2017 and 2018 signing periods. An ordinary least squares regression was employed to isolate the different policies to see the effect on signing bonuses between the 2012 and 2017 Collective Bargaining Agreements.
Recommended Citation
Theofan, Dominic, "The Use of Market Power by Major League Baseball Ownership to Suppress Player Compensation" (2019). Theses & ETDs. 5818.
https://digitalcommons.ncf.edu/theses_etds/5818