Can History Be Our Guide? Evaluating the Effects of Constitutional Rules on Size of Government

Date of Award

2008

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors

Department

Social Sciences

First Advisor

Alcock, Frank

Keywords

Causal Inference, Size of Government, Quantitative Methodology, Electoral Rules, Political Rules

Area of Concentration

Political Science

Abstract

In this thesis I argue that geography drives the causal claims relating presidential political systems and majoritarian electoral rules to lower central government spending (Persson and Tabellini: 2002). I examine the initial causal claims in light of post-treatment bias and omitted variable bias. Post-treatment bias is eliminated by using only covariates which are plausibly unaffected by the treatment, while removing those that are realized after the constitutional moment. A discussion of omitted variable bias calls for several amendments and the inclusion of new variables that capture the interaction between geography and constitutional rules. I then examine the plausibility of the counterfactuals of interest in light of the improvements presented here, concluding that inferences made about the effects of constitutional rules on size of government are more dependent on unverifiable assumptions about statistical models than the information at hand.

Rights

This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.

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