Dylan Pryor

Date of Award

2017

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors

Department

Social Sciences

First Advisor

Fitzgerald, Keith

Area of Concentration

Political Science

Abstract

Although the relationship between special interests and lawmakers is a ubiquitous part of policymaking, since the first major American tax reform legislation in 1986, the role and impact of corporations and other wealthy bodies on policy has become more powerful, rather than be mitigated. This thesis considers how corporations and other special interests have gained such power at the detriment of collective representation today, even after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 first endeavored to solve the issue of political and economic inequality. While the first chapter describes major contributors to this phenomenon, through both an institutional and historical lens, I subsequently track the evolution of the special interest-lawmaker relationship and the institutions meant to regulate those special interests, while using firsthand testimonies and current news articles to supplement the literature with empirical evidence. After discussing evidence of their influence and potential implications for collective representation in the future, I conclude that while special interest impact on policy is ubiquitous in American politics, the last thirty years have represented an especially concerning spike in their influence despite the 1986 Act. This is especially true with a tax reform bill currently in the works that could either mitigate or exacerbate the issue of a decline in collective representation on the horizon.

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