Seth Borden

Date of Award

2013

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors

Department

Social Sciences

First Advisor

Fitzgerald, Keith

Keywords

American Political Development, Taxation, Committee Theory

Area of Concentration

Political Science

Abstract

This thesis argues that the failure of modern efforts to lastingly simplify the tax code demonstrates the need for a new approach to tax reform, and suggests that reform which takes into account the historical development of tax institutions in Congress would be most effective. The study proceeds from a baseline understanding that our current tax code deviates from the standard of the Haig-Simons definition of income as much as it did before the Tax Reform Act of 1986, meaning that it is inefficient and inequitable in a variety of ways and that the TRA was unsuccessful in addressing these concerns. It establishes an analytic framework that focuses upon the changing incentives of institutional actors in Congress as the primary driver of institutional development which causes changes in the tax code over time. The primary insights gained by this analysis are that the incentive of members to insert provisions into the tax code to increase their chances of reelection has risen over time, and that the tax code is a product of the institutionally-bounded expression of the political motive to be reelected and can only be lastingly changed through institutional reform.

Rights

This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.

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