The Political Economy of Development in South Korea
Date of Award
2009
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelors
Department
Social Sciences
First Advisor
Hicks, Barbara
Keywords
International Political Economy, Development Economics, Comparative Politics, South Korea
Area of Concentration
Political Science
Abstract
A common explanation for South Korea's vulnerability to contagion in the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98 has been the close relationship between business elites and the government – so-called “crony capitalism.” Since the crisis, a number of scholars have sought to revise the history of development in South Korea, attempting to explain how corruption could exist alongside development. They attribute the success of the developmental state to systemic vulnerabilities that forced politicians to enact development-friendly policies, or to private initiative in the face of self-seeking behavior by politicians. This thesis re-examines both the history of the developmental state in South Korea and the conditions that made South Korea vulnerable to crisis in 1997-98. It argues that the state played a vital role in promoting development by coercing reluctant economic elites to invest in export promotion and technological upgrading. Furthermore, the conditions that made South Korea vulnerable to financial contagion were created not by crony capitalism but by financial liberalization, which allowed firms to build up unsustainable levels of debt and to over-invest in financial services and off-the-shelf technologies.
Recommended Citation
Gordon, Geoffrey, "The Political Economy of Development in South Korea" (2009). Theses & ETDs. 4109.
https://digitalcommons.ncf.edu/theses_etds/4109