Power Games A Microeconomic Game Theoretic Approach to Analyzing Presidential Corruption and the Draft towards Neoliberalism in Cost Rican Politics

Date of Award

2006

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors

Department

Social Sciences

First Advisor

Elliott, Catherine

Keywords

Costa Rica, Power, Schelling, Thomas, Game Theory, Expected Utility Theory

Area of Concentration

Economics

Abstract

After years of posing as corruption free, Costa Rica was shaken by scandals coming to light in 2004 concerning briberies accepted by its three most recent ex-presidents. In this thesis, I use a microeconomic game theoretic framework, combined with expected utility theory, to single out the particular incentive structures in Costa Rican politics that led to these developments. I present microeconomic games that describe the presidential power dynamics in Costa Rica during the period from 1898 to 2002 in order to reveal a common trend in Costa Rican politics of presidents undermining the Asamblea Legislativa. I find that presidents consistently power maximize by taking advantage of peripheral political institutions in the country such as the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones or USAID. Given that Costa Rican presidents turn to these bodies as opposed to the customary and public interactions with the legislature, as most non Costa Rican researchers assume, I conclude that the 2004 bribery scandals are a 'natural' evolution of presidential power manipulation.

Rights

This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.

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