I, Zombie? Why Zombie Knowledge is Fatal to Chalmers' Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Alden Hensel

Date of Award

2003

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors

Department

Humanities

First Advisor

Edidin, Aron

Keywords

Philosophy, Consciousness, Qualia, Gettier, Chalmers, Zombies

Area of Concentration

Philosophy

Abstract

Much of the disagreement among philosophers as to how to explain consciousness concerns the nature of qualitative conscious states, or qualia. Chalmers contends that qualia are nonphysical mental states. Part of his motivation for thinking this stems from what is commonly referred to as the conceivability argument, perhaps better known as the zombie argument. Chalmers claims that the concept of zombies � physical isomorphs of us that nevertheless lack qualitative conscious states � is coherent and conceivable and that, therefore, physical mental states alone cannot explain our qualitative consciousness. It is my contention that the concept of such isomorphs is not coherent. I will offer a proof by contradiction by showing that if the concept of zombies is coherent then it follows that we cannot possess certain knowledge that we do in fact possess. Further, I will argue that if the concept of zombies is untenable, then so too is the idea that some of our conscious mental states are nonphysical in nature.

Rights

This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.

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